Official recipe · Agent coordination
Reconstruct a repository supply-chain incident
Source-backed example. Practical decision guidance is proposed and untested; this is not a full implementation guide.
The problem
A suspected repository compromise leaves scattered evidence and competing explanations that need a defensible timeline.
Agent job
Collect scoped repository evidence, reconcile a timeline, test hypotheses and redact the resulting forensic report.
Expected output
An evidence-linked repository incident report.
Where this framing comes from
- Core problem: Editorial purpose framing
- Agent job: Editorial purpose framing
- Expected output: Editorial purpose framing
- Relevant job roles: Editorial purpose framing
- Benefit type: Editorial purpose framing
Editorial framing and outcome limits
Describes the task’s purpose and intended output; measured benefit, safe unsupervised operation and successful delivery are not established by this framing.
Editorial synthesis based on the linked source. This framing does not add evidence of successful delivery or results.
Case-specific decision guidance · untested
Case-specific decision guidance and first checks are original proposals. The linked source supports the attributed task; this added guidance has not been executed.
Read the attributed source evidence and original caveats below ↓
Why use this
A suspected repository incident can produce fragments that disagree about timing, authorship or what code actually reached users. A suspicious commit alone may not establish compromise, and an appealing narrative can outrun the evidence when gaps are filled with assumptions.
An evidence registry could keep observations, competing explanations and unknowns separate while preserving traceability. Security owners could review a defensible timeline and decide what further authorized investigation or disclosure is justified without exposing secrets or making premature accusations.
Why an agent / simpler alternative
- Useful judgment
Reconcile source timestamps and compare hypotheses against evidence while identifying unsupported attribution.
- Simpler alternative
Use a manual incident worksheet when the evidence set is small and the chronology is straightforward.
- Unsuitable when
The investigation lacks defensive authorization or would execute suspicious code or publicly accuse individuals.
Proposed inputs
- Name
Investigation scope
- Owner
Security owner
- Minimum scope
Named repository, authorized time window and defensive questions
- Quality check
Separate evidence collection from remediation or outreach.
- Name
Evidence descriptors
- Owner
Authorized investigator
- Minimum scope
Fictional commit, release and access-event metadata
- Quality check
Record provenance, time semantics and missing sources.
Access and setup — proposed or unknown
- Proposed minimum
Offline fictional metadata and a private evidence-ledger design.
- Compatibility unknowns
Unknown: current runtime, archive completeness, repository access and timestamp reliability.
- External actions requiring approval
Expanded investigation scope, paid queries, outreach and disclosure; suspicious code stays unexecuted.
Expected deliverable and review checks
- Proposed artifact
Evidence-linked timeline with hypothesis support, contradictions, gaps and redaction requirements.
- Critical checks
Observed facts are separated from inference and attribution.
Secrets and unnecessary personal details are excluded from any proposed report.
- Missing output evidence
No new workflow run or output inspection was performed for this overlay; use the canonical source-outcome references.
Failure signals and proposed responses
- Signal
A commit timestamp is treated as the time code reached users.
- Why it matters
The timeline may misidentify the exposure window.
- Proposed response
Separate commit, build and release events and mark delivery timing unknown.
- Signal
One account action is treated as proof of the account holder's intent.
- Why it matters
The report could falsely attribute malicious conduct.
- Proposed response
Remove the attribution and present only the supported event and unresolved explanations.
Effort and cost — unknown
- Setup work
Define evidence handling, provenance and disclosure ownership.
- Ongoing review
Reconcile contradictions and inspect report redactions.
- Unknowns
Unknown: evidence availability, query costs and specialist investigation effort.
First check — proposed, unexecuted
- Status
proposed_unexecuted
- Synthetic fixture
A fictional incident ledger contains conflicting commit/release times and an unsupported accusation tied to an account event.
- Acceptance checks
Separate exposure timing from commit timing.
Replace attribution with a bounded evidence statement.
- Stop conditions
Live investigation, suspicious-code execution, private data or third-party contact is required.
Limits
This proposed ledger exercise is not a forensic finding and establishes neither compromise nor responsibility.
Editorial candidate. This is source-backed reporting or a documented workflow. BotCurrent has not independently tested this task. A proposed Canadian adaptation is not evidence of a Canadian deployment or compliance certification.
Original source
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/blob/main/optional-skills/security/oss-forensics/SKILL.md ↗Attributed to: Teknium and Hermes Agent; adapted from RAPTOR
Official recipe- Original action type
- multi_agent_coordination
- What the source supports
- Scope repository and time window, delegate source-specific evidence collection, reconcile a timeline, test hypotheses against an evidence registry and produce a redacted forensic report.
- Source outcome limits
- This official recipe describes a procedure; it does not prove successful execution or independently reproduced results.
- Evidence attribution caveat
- This official recipe describes a procedure; it does not prove successful execution or independently reproduced results.
- Source approval description
- Limits work to defensive authorized investigation, prohibits harassment and false accusations, and calls for private coordinated disclosure.
- Named tools
- Git; public GitHub and archive sources; optional BigQuery; evidence-store scripts; Hermes delegation
- Model or version
- Unknown
- Publication date
- Unknown
- Source last checked
- 2026-10-14
- Demonstrated in Canada
- Unknown
- Canadian availability
- Unknown
- Proposed Canadian adaptation
- Proposed: use authorized Canadian project repositories and minimal public evidence; verify privacy, retention and disclosure requirements with the organization.
- Recommended approval boundaries
- Approve repository scope, paid queries and any outreach; keep suspicious code unexecuted and secrets out of retained reports; obtain security-owner review before attributing compromise.